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The line drawn on pain still holds 






Abstract: The many substantive criticisms raised against Key by me and by many of the other 
commentators will not disappear by ignoring or waving them aside with meta-discourse 
about anthropomorphism, just-so stories, or celestial teapots. The conceptual edifice Key 
inhabits and defends with such gusto may look like an impregnable fortress from the inside – 
and Key behaves as if it were. From the outside, however, it looks more like a ramshackle 
structure gaping with holes and pieced together from imperfectly understood neuroscience 
and often faulty literature citations. 
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This is my third and final commentary on Brian Key's (2016a) article ”Why fish do not feel 
pain” and his replies to critics (Key, 2016b, 2016c), specifically to my own two previous 
commentaries (Merker, 2016a, 2016b). I say final, because by now it is abundantly clear that 
pointing out conceptual flaws and evidentiary errors in Key's arguments is to no avail when 
Key chooses to either ignore them altogether (as he does with most of the many specifics of 
both kinds raised against him in my original commentary) or adds new errors in attempted 
rebuttal. I pointed out such new errors in my second commentary, and in replying to it, Key 
now compounds them by additional ones, as follows. 
 
Contrary to Key's insistence, a nucleus does not become a lamina by molecular and 
functional homology with a laminar structure, as Fig. 1 of the paper Key cites on this point 
(Karten, 2012) clearly shows, and its title loudly proclaims (viz. ”independently of 
lamination”). Without a stipulation regarding “equivalent circuitry,” Key's 21 criteria for 
feeling pain – whose grouping under four headings does not make them four, as he claims – 
exclude birds. Perhaps the absence of this natural stipulation from Key's account relates to 
the fact that including it would open a cornucopia of subcortical possibilities that his 
conceptual commitments prevent him from exploring.  
 
Even without such a stipulation there is nevertheless the exquisitely laminated tectum of fish 
to contend with. In many a species it exhibits both more laminae and a greater diversity of 
cell types than the mammalian neocortex (Meek, 1983; Sas and Maler, 1986; Schroeder et 
al., 1980; Yamamoto et al., 1999). Concerning the tectum, Key fails to correct his misreading 
of Yager et al. (1977). Besides the fact that it did not even address nociception but vision, 





that study did not, as Key asserts, show that tectal ablation in goldfish “does not affect 
escape responses to either touch or electric shock.” Instead it showed, unsurprisingly, that 
tectal ablation abolishes visually triggered escape responses conditioned to electric shock in 
goldfish. Startle responses evoked by informal touching of lesioned fish with a fish net, 
besides being irrelevant to the issue of nociception, are easily accounted for by well-known 
lower brainstem startle circuitry. Blatant errors such as Key's misrepresentation of the Yager 
et al. study (and many others detailed in my commentaries) must be acknowledged if one 
wants to be taken seriously in matters of science. It is to no avail to attempt to divert the 
argument to a different study, not previously cited. 
 
Similarly, Key misrepresents the issue for which I introduced the Lovejoy and Krauzlis (2010) 
study of 2010 in my original commentary (Merker, 2016a). I cited it, along with two other 
collicular studies, to specifically and explicitly counter Key's false assertion that the colliculus 
is limited to bottom-up processes. I did not cite it as support for a collicular role in awareness 
(these are different issues, after all!). Each of the three empirical papers I cited shows 
collicular involvement in top-down processes, contrary to Key's assertion. Moreover, on the 
separate issue of collicular involvement in awareness, if the non-mention of awareness in a 
paper concerned with other matters is evidence against collicular involvement in awareness 
(see Key's parentheses!), then Key will presumably allow me to cite the non-mention of 
awareness in Hubel and Wiesel's reports on their single-unit studies of visual cortex as 
evidence against cortical involvement in awareness.  
 
Such details, however – badly though they reflect on Key's grasp of the literature and 
conceptual coherence – must not be allowed to hide from us the more serious matter of the 
many objections and criticisms Key simply ignores, such as the larger part of the substantive 
issues of a conceptual and evidentiary nature raised in my original commentary. Instead of 
engaging issue by issue with his critics – Animal Sentience is generous in its space allotment 
in that regard – Key typically attempts the wholesale dismissal of a critic on the grounds of 
some putative misconstrual of his position. In my case the occasion was provided by my 
simplification of Key’s 21 criteria to the shorthand ”neocortex” on which they are so patently 
modelled, down to minute details such as lamination, columnar organization, and 
somatosensory submodalities of “sharp versus dull pain”!  
 
Key's inclusion of both sharp and dull pain among his criteria (i.e., Key apparently believes 
that there can be no capacity to feel pain unless both sharp and dull varieties are included!) 
bears out my contention that far from embodying theoretically well-grounded prerequisites 
for the experience of pain, his criteria simply detail his conception of the mammalian 
(human) cortical representation of nociception. Only on the basis of a doctrinal commitment 
to the problematic conjecture that the implementation of a conscious state is confined to 
cortex is such a way of proceeding even coherent. Meanwhile, that conjecture is far from 
being as secure as its adherents might think (see Merker, 2007, 2012, 2013), and requires 
one to ignore the fact that so far the strongest neural correlate of awareness has been 
recorded in a subcortical and not a cortical location (Wilke et al., 2009).    
 
In conclusion, the many substantive criticisms raised against Key by me and by many other 
commentators will not disappear by being ignored or waved aside with meta-discourse 
about anthropomorphism, just-so stories, or celestial teapots. The conceptual edifice Key 





inhabits and defends with such gusto may look like an impregnable fortress from the inside – 
and Key behaves as if it were. From the outside, however, it looks more like a ramshackle 
structure gaping with holes and pieced together from imperfectly understood neuroscience 
and often faulty literature citations (examples of both are in my original commentary). The 
largest of the holes is Key's utter failure to come to grips with the theoretical problem of the 
neural constitution of consciousness. Without a solution to that problem we cannot know 
for sure whether fish do in fact feel pain. Key has instead tried a shortcut via the 
corticocentric doctrine of consciousness, using an argument that is not even his own but 
originated with Rose (2002) more than a decade ago — a fact that went unmentioned in 
Key's article, as pointed out in the opening of my original commentary.   
 
With that my commentaries have come full circle, and I end them by expressing the hope 
that Brian Key will take the requisite steps to understand the sophisticated structure-
function arrangements of the vertebrate midbrain that are so conspicuously missing from his 
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